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Abstract: Smart card is today the most widespread secured portable computing device. Four 
years ago, we addressed the problem of scaling down database techniques for the smart card 
and we proposed the design of what we called a PicoDBMS, a full-fledged database system 
embedded in a smart card. Since then, thanks to the hardware progress and to the joint imple-
mentation efforts of our team and our industrial partner, this utopian design gave birth to a 
complete prototype running on an experimental smart card platform. This paper revisits the 
problem statement in the light of the hardware and applications evolution. Then, it introduces a 
benchmark dedicated to Pico–style databases and provides an extensive performance analysis 
of our prototype, discussing lessons learned at experimentation time and helping selecting the 
appropriate storage and indexation model for a given class of embedded applications. Finally, it 
draws new research perspectives for data management on secured chips (smart cards, USB 
dongles, multimedia rendering devices, smart objects in an ambient intelligence surrounding). 
Keywords: Embedded databases, Tamper-resistant databases, Smart card, Access control, 
Storage and indexation models, Query evaluation. 
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SGBD embarqué dans une puce : retour 
d’expérience 
 
 
Résumé: La carte à puce est aujourd'hui l'objet portable sécurisé le plus répandu. Il y a 4 ans, 
nous avons jeté les bases d’une étude portant sur l'embarquement de techniques bases de don-
nées dans une carte à puce. Cette étude a conduit à la définition de principes de conception pour 
ce que nous avons appelé alors PicoDBMS, un système de gestion de bases de données 
(SGBD) complet intégré dans une carte à puce. Depuis, grâce au progrès du matériel et aux 
efforts conjoints de notre équipe et de notre partenaire industriel, les principes définis initiale-
ment ont donné naissance à un prototype complet tournant sur une plate-forme carte à puce 
expérimentale. Cet article reconsidère la formulation du problème initial à la lumière des évolu-
tions matérielles et applicatives. Il introduit ensuite un banc d'essai dédié aux bases de données 
embarquées dans des puces et présente une analyse de performance détaillée de notre prototype. 
Enfin, il dresse des perspectives de recherche dans le domaine de la gestion de données dans les 
puces sécurisées. 
Mots clés: Bases de données embarquées, Confidentialité et protection des données, Carte à 
puce, Contrôle d’accès, Modèles de stockage et d'indexation, Evaluation de requêtes. 
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1 Introduction 
Thirty years ago, Moreno’s patent marked the genesis of the prestigious smart card story, 
making it today the most widespread secured portable computing device. Smart cards have 
been used successfully around the world in various applications such as banking, pay-TV or 
GSM subscriber identification, loyalty, healthcare and transportation. Standards for multi-
application support, like JavaCard [1], revolutionized the development and distribution of smart 
card applications. As smart cards became more and more versatile, multi-application and pow-
erful (32 bit processor, more than 1MB of stable storage), the need for database techniques 
arose. Basically, embedding query processing, access rights and transaction management in the 
card makes application code smaller and safer. However, smart cards have specific hardware 
constraints (tiny RAM, very costly write in stable storage…) making database techniques em-
ployed in traditional DBMS and even lightweight DBMS [2][3][4][5] irrelevant. In a previous 
paper, we addressed the problem of scaling down database techniques for the smart card and 
proposed the design of what we called a PicoDBMS [6]. This preliminary work opened up ex-
citing research perspectives towards the design of DBMS kernels dedicated to new forms of 
ultra-light computing devices. 
Four years after the publication of this design, three important questions deserve to be raised. 
The first question is undoubtedly “Is scaling down database techniques for smart cards still a 
topical issue today?”. In other words, the question is whether the hardware progress and the 
applications evolution drastically change the initial problem statement. “Can the PicoDBMS 
design effectively accommodate real hardware platforms?” is also an important question related 
to the feasibility of the approach and introducing a valuable discussion about lessons learned at 
experimentation time. Finally, “Is PicoDBMS the definite answer to a sporadic problem or 
rather a first step towards a broader and longer term research?” is a legitimate question putting 
database components on secured chip in perspective. The objective of this paper is precisely to 
answer these three questions.  
Regarding the evolution of the problem statement, smart card hardware resources do not es-
cape Moore’s law in terms of CPU speed and memory size. However, the problem stated in [6] 
puts more emphasis on the resource dissymmetry (e.g., powerful CPU vs. tiny RAM, very fast 
read vs. very low write in stable storage, etc) than on their scarcity. This balance did not evolve 
much is the recent past and, according to smart card manufacturers, should remain rather stable 
in the near future. It is anyway mandatory to assess the precise impact of hardware progress on 
the initial PicoDBMS design. Application requirements suffered recently a stronger mutation. 
The PicoDBMS design was mainly motivated by the management of secured portable folders 
with an emphasis on healthcare folders. In the last years, secure portable folders have received 
a growing attention from major industrial actors, broadening their scope of application (e.g., 
MasterCard’s Open Data Store [7]). In addition, the introduction of secured chips in usual com-
puting infrastructures is paving the way for new large scale applications.  First, secured chips 
are being integrated in PC platforms [8] and consumer appliances [9] to prevent piracy and to 
support advanced Digital Right Management models [10][11] where conditions can be evalu-
ated on consumer’s profile and/or historical data. Hence, these data need to be protected.  Sec-
ond, ambient intelligence is flooding many aspects of our everyday life with smart objects gath-
ering information about our habits and preferences, threatening the citizen’s elementary rights 
to privacy. Therefore, the need for secured portable folders protecting the privacy of personal 
data evolves towards secured (fixed or portable) folders protecting the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of either personal or external data. The first contribution of this paper is to revisit the 
PicoDBMS problem statement in the light of the hardware and application evolutions. 
A full-fledged PicoDBMS prototype was initially developed in JavaCard and demonstrated 
on a Palmera smart card, a commercial platform provided by Axalto (the Schlumberger smart 
card subsidiary) [12]. While this prototype established the feasibility of the approach, its per-
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formance was actually far from those expected in [6]. This prototype has been rewritten in C, 
polished, and recently adapted to ZePlatform, the future generation of Axalto’s smart card plat-
form. Three years were necessary to get this new hardware platform and to adapt its OS kernel 
(with the help of Axalto) to meet the performance requirements of data intensive applications. 
A benchmark dedicated to Pico-style databases has been designed and used to assess the rela-
tive performance of candidate storage and indexation data structures. In addition, a hardware 
cycle-accurate simulator has been used to predict the performance of our PicoDBMS engine on 
databases that largely exceed the current smart card storage capacity. The second contribution 
of this paper is to expose the valuable learning obtained during this long and tricky experimen-
tation process. 
If PicoDBMS has proved to be an effective answer to the initial problem statement (i.e., se-
cured portable folder in smart cards), this does not mean however that this problem statement 
encompasses all the situations where data management can benefit from secured chips. To illus-
trate this, chip manufacturers are announcing in the short term Mass Storage Cards4 combining 
a secured chip with a huge amount (several GB) of unsecured stable memory. Hence, the 
amount of data to be considered and the new forms of attacks to be faced impose to strongly 
revisit the database technology on chip. Contactless environments, future (long-term) stable 
storage technologies, co-design requirements are other considerations deserving research ef-
forts. The third contribution of this paper is therefore to sketch important research directions 
related to data management issues on secured chips.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the PicoDBMS problem statement ac-
cording to the evolution of smart cards technologies and usages, answering the first question 
raised in the introduction, and presents the related works. Section 3 recalls from [6] important 
aspects of the PicoDBMS internals (i.e., storage model and query processing). This technical 
description gives the pre-requisites to the in depth performance analysis developed in Section 4. 
Section 4 first introduces the objectives of the experimentation, exposes the chosen metrics, 
then discusses the code/data footprint and the query execution performance for each considered 
storage structure. This section answers the second question raised in the introduction. The third 
question is actually the subject of Section 5, which draws important research perspectives we 
foresee in the context of data management on secured chips. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2 DBMS on Chip: Evolution of the Problem Statement 
2.1 Evolution of Smart Card Technologies 
SmartcardSmartcard I/O
CPU
32 bits
Security
bloc
ROM
96KB
S-RAM
4KB
E2PROM
64KB
Gemplus, ST 
Microelectronics, 
Hitachi, Atmel, 
Infineon, 
NEC Electronics, … codeOS Data
BUS
I/OCPU
32 bits
Security
bloc
ROMS-RAM16KB E
2PROM
Sharp, Philips, 
ST Micro., 
EM Micro., …
Future tends (up to 1MB)  
codeOS
BUS
FLASH
Data
 
           (a) Current smart cards   (b) Future (short-term) smart cards 
Figure 1. Typical smart cards architectures. 
Current powerful smart cards include in a monolithic chip, a 32 bit RISC processor cadenced 
at about 50 MHz, memory modules composed of about 96 KB of ROM, 4 KB of static RAM 
and 64 KB of EEPROM, and security modules (random number generator, cryptographic co-
processor, etc.). The ROM is used to store the operating system, fixed data and standard rou-
                                                          
4 MOPASS CONSORTIUM. http://www.mopass.info/english/ 
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tines. The RAM is used as working memory (heap and stack). EEPROM is used to store persis-
tent information, and holds data and downloaded programs (in case of multi-application cards). 
Figure 1(a) pictures this typical smart card architecture.  
The smart card internal resource balance is very unique. Indeed, the on-board processing 
power, calibrated to sustain cryptographic computations and enforce smart cards security prop-
erties, is oversized wrt the small amount of embedded data. In addition, stable memory 
(EEPROM) shares strong commonality with RAM in terms of granularity (direct access to any 
memory word) and read performance (60-100 ns/word), but suffers from a dramatically slow 
write time (about 10 ms per word). Finally, only a few bytes of RAM remain available for the 
embedded applications, the major part of the RAM being preempted by the operating system 
and the virtual machine (in case of Java enabled cards). This unusual computing environment – 
compared to traditional servers running DBMSs – can be summarized by the following proper-
ties: 
(P1) Very high processing power wrt the small embedded data amount. 
(P2) Very tight RAM wrt the amount of data to be processed. 
(P3) Fast reads and slow writes in stable memory. 
The first PicoDBMS design was driven by these properties. It is therefore important to assess 
to which extent these properties are impacted by the hardware progress. 
2.1.1 Analysis of Property P1 
During the last ten years, embedded processors improved from the first 8-bit generation ca-
denced at 2 MHz to the current 32 bit generation cadenced at 50 MHz with an added crypto-
graphic co-processor. One can consider that existing CPU are powerful enough to meet existing 
applications requirements and that users might prefer less functionality at a lower cost [14]. On 
the other hand, we think that at least three factors advocate for a continuous growth of the CPU 
power. First, the rapid evolution of smart card throughput (e.g., high delivery contactless cards, 
USB cards) allows smart card applications to evolve towards CPU intensive data flows process-
ing using cryptographic functionalities [15] (e.g., pay TV based on chip decryption and access 
control over embedded profile). Second, many research efforts and manufacturers investments 
focus on the development of multi-application and multi-threaded smart card operating systems 
necessitating even more CPU power. Finally, the smart card cost is mainly driven by the 
amount of embedded memory (RAM and EEPROM) rather than by the amount of processing 
power. Smart card being a mass market technology, this consideration favors enhancing the 
processing power rather than the amount of memory. Hence we are convinced that property P1 
will remain valid in the future. 
2.1.2 Analysis of Property P2  
Currently, smart cards hold a few KB of static RAM, almost entirely consumed by the operat-
ing system and by the Java virtual machine in Java cards. Despite the evolution of the comput-
ing power (that roughly follows Moore’s law), the gap between the RAM available to the ap-
plications and the other resources (e.g., CPU speed and stable storage capacity) will certainly 
keep on increasing for two reasons. First, manufacturers tend to reduce the hardware resources 
to their minimum in order to save production costs on large-scale markets5. The cost of a chip 
being closely linked to its surface, the relative cell size of static RAM (SRAM cell is 16 times 
less compact than ROM and FLASH, 4 times less compact than EEPROM) makes it a critical 
component in the overall cost. This leads to calibrate the RAM size to its minimum, according 
to the applications requirements [16]. Second, there is today no clear motivation to enlarge the 
RAM area because (i) the smart card is not autonomous (it takes its electrical energy from the 
reader), thereby precluding some form of asynchrony (e.g., buffered writes would be lost if the 
                                                          
5 Semiconductors Industrial Association, STATS: SIA Annual Databook, 2002. http//:www.semichips.org 
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card is withdrawn from the reader); (ii) Read accesses to stable storage are direct and fast mak-
ing traditional cache hierarchy not mandatory; and (iii) the RAM competes with other compo-
nents on the same silicon die [17][18]. Thus, the more RAM the less stable storage while the 
trend is on embedding more and more persistent data. As a consequence, smart card manufac-
turers privilege stable storage to the detriment of RAM (see announced smart cards products in 
table 1). RAM is strictly calibrated to hold the execution stack required by the on-board pro-
grams and the RAM increase is only motivated by the support of more complex operating sys-
tems and virtual machines. 
Table 1. Short-term smart card memory capacity (in KB). 
Manufacturer Product name ROM FLASH(**) EEPROM(*) RAM 
Renesas AE57C6 368 - 132 10 
ST Micro. ST22N2567 368 - 256 16 
ST Micro. ST22FJ1M8 128 768 256 16 
Philips P9ST0249 512 256 256 16 
* Refers to traditional EEPROM and to ST Page-FLASH (have the same read/write access time). 
** Refers to coarse-grain FLASH usually used to store application code. 
 
2.1.3 Analysis of Property P3 
Let us now consider how hardware advances can impact the memory size limit, and its 
read/write performance asymmetry. Current smart cards rely on a well established and slightly 
out-of-date hardware technology (0.35 micron) to minimize production costs and increase secu-
rity [19]. However, the market pressure generated by emerging applications lead to a rapid in-
crease of the smart card storage capacity. Taking advantage of a 0.18 micron technology allows 
embedding up to 256 KB of EEPROM (see table 1). In the same time, several manufacturers 
are attempting to integrate denser memory on chip. Current prototypes integrate FLASH mem-
ory for its high compactness (as compact as ROM, much more than EEPROM). However, 
while read and write times in FLASH are roughly comparable to EEPROM, a whole FLASH 
bank need to be erased before writing it, making the total cost of an update very high. This 
makes FLASH memory inappropriate for data-centric applications managing usually a large 
amount of small data. Thus, the trend is combining a traditional FLASH holding the programs 
with an EEPROM used as the data store [20]. In a long term perspective, researchers in mem-
ory technologies aim at developing the perfect alternative, meaning a highly compact non-
volatile memory providing fast read/write operations with fine grain access (e.g., MEMS, 
OUM, PCM, etc.). However, the integration of such technology in the smart card context is an 
even longer perspective due to intrinsic difficulties (very high security level that need to be 
proved for any new technology, low manufacturing cost motivating the usage of old amortized 
technologies, complexity to integrate all components in the same silicon die). 
2.1.4 Conclusion 
In the light of the preceding analysis, and despite the undeniable hardware progress, we con-
sider that properties P1, P2 and P3 are still valid today and will remain valid in the short-term 
(see figure 1(b)) and medium-term. Future memory technologies will probably modify this as-
sumption but must be regarded as a (very) long term perspective. 
                                                          
6 See http://www.electronicstalk.com/news/ren/ren117.html for a press release.  
7 See http://www.st.com/stonline/books/pdf/docs/10705.pdf for the documentation. 
8 See http://www.st.com/stonline/books/pdf/docs/10497.pdf for the documentation. 
9 See http://www.semiconductors.philips.com/markets/identification/products/hipersmart/ for a description. 
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2.2 Evolution of Smart Card Usage 
The first smart card application was developed for the French banking system in the 1980s to 
reduce the losses associated with magnetic credit card fraud. Since then, smart cards have been 
used successfully in a wide range of applications like GSM subscriber identification, pay TV 
[15], electronic wallet [21], access to network resources, insurance and healthcare [22]. Now, 
large-scale governmental projects are pushing for an even wider acceptance of smart cards 
among applications, states and countries. For example, the NETC@RDS Project [23] aims at 
improving the access of mobile European citizens to national health care systems. The US Fed-
eral Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification [24] aims at using smart cards as a 
vector for employees to access building, to secure networks, but also to digitally sign or encrypt 
documents such as secure e-mail and administrative requests. Also, multi-purpose ID cards 
projects [25][26] (e.g., passport, driving license, e-voting, insurance, transport, etc.) have been 
launched in many countries, including Europe [27], USA [28][29][30], Japan [31][32] and 
China [33]. All these applications are mainly concerned with user identity control but each ap-
plication comes with a set of persistent data to be managed and protected. 
The form factor of smart cards also evolved along the years to cope with new usages. This 
gave birth to a wide range of secured chips like ibuttons [34], rings (e.g., JavaRing), se-
rial/parallel/USB secure dongles, and USB “crypto tokens”. Most of these devices share strong 
commonalities with traditional smart cards since they use an embedded 32 bit microcontroller 
to manage the security process and simply differ in their interface to the host they connect to 
[35]. Secured chips are sometimes integrated at the hearth of a computing system like in the 
TCPA architecture to protect PC platforms against piracy [8] or in the SmartRight architecture 
to enforce Digital Right Management at the rendering devices [9]. Finally, chips are today inte-
grated in a large diversity of usual objects – making them smarter – to form an ambient intelli-
gence surrounding. While security seems not the primary concern in this latter case, the strong 
demand of individuals for enforcing their elementary rights to privacy may quickly change the 
situation. As a conclusion, smart card-like secured chips should be almost everywhere in the 
very short term. The question now is whether data management techniques need to be embed-
ded on these devices. To help answering this question, we introduce below four representative 
application scenarios. 
Healthcare folder: healthcare folder is representative of portable personal folders exhibiting 
strong database requirements and has been the motivating example of the PicoDBMS study. 
The information stored in the future health cards should include the holder’s identification, in-
surance data, emergency data, the holder’s doctors, prescriptions and even links to heavier data 
(X-ray examination…) stored on hospital servers. Different users may share data in the holder’s 
folder with different privileges: the doctors who consult the patient’s past records and prescribe 
drugs, the pharmacists who deliver drugs, the insurance agents who refund the patient, public 
organizations which maintain statistics or study the impact of drugs correlation in population 
samples and the holder herself. HIPAA specifications [36], which edicts principles protecting 
personal healthcare information, make smart cards an ideal partner to hold medical data 
[37][38]. Embedded data management techniques are mandatory to actually store, organize and 
query this huge amount of data and to control the respective privileges of each user. 
Customer wallet: MasterCard recently introduced the MasterCard Open Data Storage 
(MODS) specifications [7] to enable cardholders and service providers (or any merchant third 
party) to store and retrieve objects directly on customers’ smart cards. The benefit for service 
providers is to keep aware of the consumer habits. The main benefit for the customer is to take 
advantage of special offers related to her past consumption. However, the price to pay for the 
latter benefit is high: not only the customer activity can be monitored in each shop the customer 
visits, but also the cross references between her different activities. The enforcement by the 
smart card of sophisticated access rights are therefore a prerequisite to give the control on the 
stored data back to the customer. As stated by MasterCard itself, the MODS API must “meet 
the desire expressed by customers to better control how much information they are willing to 
8  N. Anciaux, L. Bouganim, P. Pucheral 
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share with whom” [7]. The IBM-Harris report on consumer privacy survey strongly highlights 
this same requirement [39]. 
Digital Right Management (DRM): Digital piracy is threatening the global multimedia con-
tent industry (a 16% decline of the music market revenues since 1999 [40]) while forecast insti-
tutes agree on the unprecedented potential of the mobile audio and video market. Basic DRM 
models fail in solving this paradox because they badly adapt to several new attractive usage 
scenarios and because consumers are reluctant to use them for privacy preservation and fairness 
concerns. Several initiatives [10][41][11] demonstrate the need for expressive DRM languages. 
Such languages allow business rules to express conditions on historical data, on user’s profile 
and on contextual information (e.g., Alice may listen freely to a piece of music according to her 
past activity or Bob may download a given e-lesson provided he is registered as student in this 
course and passed the preceding exam successfully). These data must be protected against in-
formation leakage injuring privacy as well as against tampering from the user herself. Smart 
card data management techniques are well suited to answer this requirement [42]. 
Aware Home: smart objects are invading the domestic area to capture the habits and prefer-
ences of individual with the laudable objective to provide them with a personalized service. 
Once organized and centralized, such personal data are however rather sensible and need to be 
protected against potential misuse. In another context, Hippocratic databases [43] have been 
introduced as a mean for the data owner to control the usage of her data by giving (or refusing) 
her consent to the exploitation of a given data for a given purpose under given conditions. We 
advocate here the use of secured chip embedding data storage and access right management to 
implement Hippocratic smart objects. 
These four scenarios do nothing but illustrating the same needs for data management tech-
niques on chip in different contexts. 
2.3 Problem Statement 
The initial formulation of the PicoDBMS problem [6] was strongly influenced by the personal 
medical folder example (the best motivating example at that time). It stated the necessity to 
embed on a smart card the data to be protected as well as the software components required to 
manage them, namely a Storage Manager, a Query Manager, a Transaction Manager and an 
Access right manager. Then it introduced seven rules to design these components according to 
the smart card constraints. 
The approach is still valid and we will follow the previous paper footstep to express the prob-
lem statement. However, the baseline is slightly different. As discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, several scenarios can serve today as motivating examples and the PicoDBMS design must 
satisfy all. While the form of the data, the expected transactional properties and the query facili-
ties requirements may vary among the scenarios, they all share the same ultimate requirement 
for a powerful access control management enforcing the confidentiality of embedded data. This 
point strongly distinguishes a PicoDBMS from a traditional DBMS. Querying the data should 
even not be a concern for a PicoDBMS. What is actually expected from a PicoDBMS is to store 
the data securely (thanks to the smart card tamper resistance) and to act as a trusted doorkeeper, 
which authenticates each user and solely delivers her authorized view of the data. The computa-
tion made on these data after their delivery is not the matter. 
In the light of this remark, the main point is to determine which data management techniques 
are required by this doorkeeper. We make the assumption that the user identifica-
tion/authentication is ensured traditionally (e.g., by a login/password) and does not deserve 
further discussion. PicoDBMS has been designed in the relational context. Hence, the consid-
ered access control model is the SQL one. For the sake of simplicity, we concentrate on the 
core of the model and consider that privileges are granted/revoked to users on relations or 
views. Since data confidentiality is the primary concern, we introduce below a classification of 
the read access authorizations a PicoDBMS must be able to express and enforce. 
Smart Card DBMS: where are we now?  9 
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Table 2. Description of access rights on embedded data. 
Acronym Auth° Access right type Required database op-erator(s) Example
10 
P SA Subset of attributes Project Name of doctors 
SP OA Predicates on a single relation Select, Project Name of non-specialist doctors 
SPJ OA Predicates on two relations  
(direct relationship) 
Select, Project, Join Name of doctors the patient has 
visited last month 
SPJn OA Predicates on several relations 
(transitive relationship) 
Select, Project, Joins Name of doctors who prescribed 
antibiotics to the patient 
SPG CA Single relation, mono-attribute 
aggregation 
Select, Project, Group 
(aggregate) 
Number of doctor per specialty 
SPJG CA Several relations, mono-
attribute aggregation  
Select, Project, Join, 
Group (aggregate) 
Number of prescriptions per 
doctor’s specialty 
SPJGn CA Several relations, multi-attribute 
aggregation 
Select, Project, Join, 
Group (aggregate) 
Number of visits per doctor’s 
specialty and per type of drug 
 
For the sake of generality, the categories of authorizations are expressed over an entity rela-
tionship database schema. Schema authorizations (SA) are defined on the database intension 
(schema) without considering the database extension (occurrences). Occurrence authorizations 
(OA) grant access to some occurrences, depending on predicate(s) expressed on their proper-
ties, or on the existence of a relationship (either direct or transitive) with another granted occur-
rence. Computed data authorizations (CA) grant access to computed values without granting 
access to the occurrences taking part in the computation (e.g., averaged values are disclosed but 
not the related individual records).  
We distinguish below seven representative authorization types for a relational database, de-
rived from the SA, OA and CA classes. This classification is important to determine the ex-
pected functionalities of a PicoDBMS and will serve as well to assess the performance of the 
system. table 2 summarizes these authorization types. SA authorizations may be implemented 
by views involving the project operator (P access right). The predicates of OA can apply to 
attributes of one relation (SP access right), two relations (direct relationship, SPJ access right), 
or several relations (transitive relationship, SPJn access right). Finally, CA are implemented by 
means of views involving aggregates. The aggregation may be mono-attribute (i.e., group by on 
a single attribute) and consider a single relation (SPG access right), mono-attribute and con-
sider several relations (SPJG access right), or multi-attribute, potentially considering several 
relations (SPJGn access right).  
A trivial solution to enforce these authorizations would be to materialize each view in a sepa-
rate file and to externalize this file when a user requests it. This undoubtedly would reduce the 
PicoDBMS footprint to its minimum (file management) and ease its integration in the smart 
card. However, this badly adapts to data and authorization updates and would result in a huge 
data replication among files, thereby hurting the smart card limited storage constraint.  
Thus, a dynamic evaluation of the authorized views must be considered as a prerequisite in 
the problem statement. This implies to embed on chip the ability to compute database operators 
and run query execution plans implementing views. The problem statement can thus be formu-
lated as follows: 
1. to design a DBMS supporting SA, OA, and CA authorizations; 
2. to support accurately data updates and access control policies evolutions; 
3. to comply with the strong smart card hardware constraints. 
 
This problem statement leads to a set of design rules derived from the smart card properties: 
                                                          
10 The examples show that the complexity of authorization is not related to the size of a database. A 
medical folder database – composed of the Doctor, Visit, Prescription and Drug relations – is considered 
but similar examples could be derived from all application scenarios mentioned above. 
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− Compactness rule: minimize the size of the data, indexation structures and PicoDBMS 
footprint to cope with the limited stable storage area. 
− RAM rule: minimize the RAM consumption of all operators given its extremely limited 
size. 
− Write rule: minimize write operations given their dramatic cost (≈10 ms/word). 
− Read rule: take advantage of the fast read operations in stable storage (≈100 ns/word). 
− Access rule: take advantage of the low granularity and direct access capability of the sta-
ble memory for both read and write operations.  
− Security rule: never externalize private data from the chip and minimize the algorithms 
complexity to avoid security holes. 
− CPU rule: take advantage of the over-dimensioned CPU power, compared to the amount 
of embedded data. 
2.4 Related Works 
From the early 90’s, the need for data management appears in several applications running on 
small devices, from industrial controllers and cable-television set-top boxes to medical-imaging 
systems and airplanes flight controls. This motivates manufacturers of embedded solutions to 
focus on the development of embedded DBMSs. The objective of embedded DBMSs is to pro-
vide efficient data access [44][45] and transactional features (ACID properties), while cohabit-
ing with others applications in the device (especially the ones using the database). The embed-
ded DBMS design has been driven so far by code footprint minimization, obtained by simplifi-
cation and componentization, portability on multiple devices / operating systems, and self-
administration [46]. Generally, embedded DBMS are dynamically linked with the embedded 
application. Few academic studies have been conducted in this area [47][48], but many com-
mercial products exist like Pervasive SQL 2000 [49], Empress database [50], and Berkeley 
DB[51].  
In parallel, the rapidly growing number of mobile phones, PDAs and other portable consumer 
devices stimulates the main DBMS editors to adapt their products to this promising market [4]. 
Thus, light versions of popular DBMS like IBM DB2 Everyplace [52][3], Oracle Lite [2], Sy-
base SQL Anywhere Studio [5], Microsoft SQL Server for Windows CE [4] have been designed 
for small devices. The DBMS editors pay a great attention to data replication and synchroniza-
tion with a central database in order to allow offline executions and resynchronization at recon-
nection time. Again, the small footprint is obtained by simplifying the DBMS code and by a 
selective linking of the DBMS code with the application code. Light DBMSs are portable to a 
large variety of small devices and operating systems (e.g., PalmOs, WinCE, Embedded Linux). 
While addressing different market shares and having followed different development paths, it is 
now quite difficult to clearly distinguish embedded DBMSs from light DBMSs. Actually, the 
former approach adds incrementally DBMS features (transaction support, SQL management, 
etc.) while the latter removes unnecessary features to minimize the code footprint.  
By considering smart cards as traditional small devices, one could envision using embedded 
DBMSs or Light DBMSs technology in this environment. However the primary objective of 
smart cards being security, smart cards have a very specific hardware architecture. The hard-
ware resource asymmetry pointed out in Section 2.3 entails a thorough re-thinking of the tech-
niques usually used for embedded / light DBMSs.  
Sensor networks gathering weather, pollution or traffic information have motivated several 
recent works related to on-chip data management. Directed Diffusion [53], TinyDB [54], and 
Cougar [55] focus on the way to collect and process continuous streams of sensed data. Opti-
mization techniques for queries distributed among sensors are investigated in [56][57]. Tech-
niques to reduce power consumption induced by radio frequency communications, one of the 
major sensor constraints, are proposed in [58]. Although sensors and smart cards share some 
hardware constraints, the objectives of both environments diverge as well as the techniques 
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used to meet their respective requirements. Basically, the on-chip database capabilities required 
in a sensor are limited to data filtering and aggregation to reduce the output flow of the sensor 
thereby saving energy [59]. In addition, response-time constraints are strongly different in both 
cases. Depending on the usage of the sensor network, time constraints may be either inexistent 
or hard real-time while time constraints in the smart card context are related to the user interac-
tion. Finally, sensors often compute queries on streaming data or on a single local embedded 
relation while a smart card PicoDBMS may have to manage several relations. 
A small number of studies have specifically addressed the area of data management on smart 
cards. The first attempts towards a smart card DBMS were ISOL’s SQLJava Machine and the 
ISO standard for smart card database language, SCQL [60]. Both were addressing generation of 
smart cards endowed with 8 KB of stable memory. While SQLJava Machine and SCQL de-
signs were limited to mono-relation queries, they exemplify the growing interest for smart card 
DBMS. More recently, the MasterCard Open Data Storage initiative (MODS) [7] promoted a 
common API to allow retailers, banks and other organizations to access and store data on users’ 
smart cards with an enhanced security for the smart card holder. However, MODS is based on 
flat files, crude access rights (i.e., file level access rights), and thus, does not provide neither 
compact data model nor query processing. Again, this initiative shows the interest of develop-
ing smart card DBMS techniques.  
A recent study proposes specific storage techniques to manage data in flash memory on a 
smart card [61]. The design is also limited to mono-relation queries and is strongly impacted by 
the physical characteristics of the target smart card architecture. Indeed, they propose to store 
the data in NOR type of FLASH memory generally dedicated to store programs as ROM re-
placement. Since updates in NOR flash memory are very costly (updating a single data induces 
a large and costly bloc erasure), the techniques are driven by update cost minimization (using 
dummy records and deleted bits). While this study shows the impact of hardware characteristics 
on the DBMS internals, it does not comply with the memory constraints of the smart card nor 
addresses complex query processing, mandatory to extract the authorized part of the data. 
Finally, let us remark that GnatDB [62], presented as a “small-footprint, secure database sys-
tem” may fit in a smart card since it has an 11 KB footprint. Actually, GnatDB was designed to 
manage a small amount of external data, the smart card being used to protect remote data 
against accidental or malicious corruption. GnatDB thus does not address query processing nor 
internal data storage and indexation. As a conclusion, PicoDBMS [6] was the first study con-
sidering a full-fledged DBMS on smart card. 
3 PicoDBMS at a Glance 
As the problem statement makes clear, the central point of the study is on evaluating dynami-
cally authorized views implementing SA, OA, and CA authorizations on chip. We recall from 
[6] the basic principles of PicoDBMS that are related to this issue. We do not discuss others 
aspects, except when they infer in the evaluation process (e.g., transaction processing), in 
which case we give the minimum information required for the understanding.  
The modules that must be present on-chip wrt the confidentiality target are: a storage manager 
organizing data and indices into the chip stable memory, a query manager building execution 
plans (including selections, projections, joins and aggregates operators) and capable of process-
ing rather complex views on-chip and finally an access right manager providing grant and re-
voke functionalities on the defined user views and preventing from externalizing unauthorized 
data. A transaction manager enforcing the atomicity of a sequence of updates must also be em-
bedded on chip for consistency purpose.  
The other modules do not impact data confidentiality. Thus, they can be stored on the termi-
nal, within the JDBC driver interfacing the user application with the embedded database en-
gine. User’s authorized database schema is externalized at connection time, allowing the JDBC 
to parse the query and verify the SQL syntax. As well, the order by clause, if any, is evaluated 
on the terminal. Note that these remote computations do not hurt the security rule since they 
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only involve authorized information. Thus, PicoDBMS allows confidential data sharing among 
several users connecting to the database one at a time. Figure 2 pictures the PicoDBMS archi-
tecture. 
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Figure 2.  PicoDBMS Architecture. 
3.1 Storage and Indexation  
The simplest way to organize data is Flat Storage (FS), where tuples are stored sequentially 
and attribute values are embedded in the tuples. The main advantage of FS is access locality. 
However, in our context, FS has two main drawbacks. First, this storage organization is space 
consuming. While normalization rules preclude attributes conjunction redundancy to occur, 
they do not avoid attribute value duplicates. Second, it is inefficient, inducing the sequential 
computation of all operations in the absence of index structures. Adding index structures to FS 
may solve the second problem while worsening the first one. 
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Values
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Pointers
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Pointers
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R.a
Relation S
Pointers
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 (a) Domain Storage of a Regular Attribute.      (b) Domain Storage of Foreign-key Attribute. 
Figure 3.  Domain Storage. 
Based on the critique of FS, it follows that a PicoDBMS storage model should guarantee both 
data and index compactness. Since locality is no longer an issue in our context (read rule), 
pointer-based storage models inspired by MMDBMS [63][64][65] can help providing com-
pactness. The basic idea is to preclude any duplicate value to occur. This can be achieved by 
grouping values in domains (sets of unique values). We call this model Domain Storage (DS). 
As shown in figure 3, tuples reference their attribute values by means of pointers. Furthermore, 
a domain can be shared among several attributes. This is particularly efficient for enumerated 
types, which vary on a small and determined set of values.  
One may wonder about the cost of tuple creation, update and deletion since they may generate 
insertion and deletion of values in domains. While these actions are more complex than their FS 
counterpart, their implementation remains more efficient in the smart card context, simply be-
cause the amount of data to be written is much smaller (write rule). To amortize the slight over-
head of domain storage, we only store by domain all large attributes (i.e., greater than a pointer 
size) containing duplicates. Obviously, attributes with no duplicates (e.g., keys) need not be 
stored by domain but with FS. Variable-size attributes – generally larger than a pointer – can 
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also be advantageously stored in domains even if they do not contain duplicates. The benefit is 
not storage savings but memory management simplicity (all tuples of all relations become 
fixed-size) and log compactness. 
Value i
DomainRelation R
Values
S.b
Relation RR.aRelation S
Pointers
Index on S.b
ValuesPointers
R.att Index on R.att
Pointers
Pointers
Ki
 
 (a) Ring Index on a Regular Attribute.                  (b) Ring Index on a Foreign-key Attribute. 
Figure 4.  Ring Storage. 
We now address index compactness along with data compactness. Unlike disk-based DBMS 
that favor indices which preserve access locality, smart cards should make intensive use of sec-
ondary (i.e., pointer-based) indices. The point here is to make these indices efficient and as 
compact as possible, integrating them in the storage model instead of additional structures. Let 
us first consider select indices. A select index is typically made of two parts: a collection of 
values and a collection of pointers linking each value to all tuples sharing it. Assuming the in-
dexed attribute varies on a domain, the index collection of values can be saved since it exactly 
corresponds to the domain extension. The extra cost incurred by the index is then reduced to the 
pointers linking index values to tuples. Let us go one step further and get these pointers almost 
for free. The idea is to store these value-to-tuple pointers in place of the tuple-to-value pointers 
within the tuples (i.e., pointers stored in the tuples to reference their attribute values in the do-
mains). This yields to an index structure which makes a ring from the domain values to the tu-
ples, as shown in figure 4(a). The ring index can also be used to access the domain values from 
the tuples and thus serve as data storage model. Thus we call Ring Storage (RS) the storage of a 
domain-based attribute indexed by a ring. The index storage cost is reduced to its lowest bound, 
that is, one pointer per domain value, whatever the cardinality of the indexed relation. This im-
portant storage saving is obtained at the price of extra work for projecting a tuple to the corre-
sponding attribute since retrieving the value of a ring stored attribute means traversing in aver-
age half of the ring (i.e., up to reach the domain value). 
Join indices [66] can be treated in a similar way. A join predicate of the form (R.a=S.b) as-
sumes that R.a and S.b vary on the same domain. Storing both R.a and S.b by means of rings 
leads to define a join index. In this way, each domain value is linked by two separate rings to 
all tuples from R and S sharing the same join attribute value. As most joins are performed on 
key attributes, R.a being a primary key and S.b being the foreign key referencing R.a, key at-
tributes are stored with FS in our model. Nevertheless, since R.a is the primary key of R, its 
extension forms precisely a domain, even if not stored outside of R. Since attribute S.b takes it 
value in R.a’s domain, it references R.a values by means of pointers. Thus, the domain-based 
storage model naturally implements for free a unidirectional join index from S.b to R.a (see 
figure 4(b)). If traversals from R.a to S.b need be optimized too, a bi-directional join index is 
required. This can be simply achieved by defining a ring index on S.b. Figure 4(b) shows the 
resulting situation where each R tuple is linked by a ring to all S tuples matching with it and 
vice-versa. The cost of a bi-directional join index is restricted to a single pointer per R tuple, 
whatever the cardinality of S. This index structure can even be enhanced by combining RS and 
DS. This leads to a bi-directional join index providing direct (i.e., one single pointer) traversals 
from S.b to R.a. This enhanced storage model, called Ring Inverse Storage (RIS), requires one 
additional pointer per S and R tuples. Its storage cost is much more expensive, and thus must 
give a high performance benefit to be adopted.  
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3.2 Query Processing 
Traditional query processing strives to exploit large main memory for storing temporary data 
structures (e.g., hash tables) and intermediate results and resort to materialization on disk in 
case of memory overflow. These algorithms cannot be used for a PicoDBMS due to the write 
rule. To tackle this issue, we propose query processing techniques that do not use any working 
RAM area nor incur any writes in stable memory.  
Let us first consider the execution of SPJ (Select/Project/Join) queries. As usual, the query 
optimizer first generates an “optimal” query execution plan (QEP) that is then executed. The 
optimizer can consider different shapes of QEP: left-deep, right-deep or bushy trees. In a left-
deep tree, operators are executed sequentially and each intermediate result is materialized. 
Right-deep trees execute operators in a pipeline fashion, thus avoiding intermediate result mate-
rialization, but all left relations need to be materialized. Bushy trees offer opportunities to deal 
with the size of intermediate results and memory consumption [67].  
Materialization
Pipelining
drug
doc
visit
drug presc.
doc
visit
drug
visit
doc
presc. visit
σ
doc drug presc.
Left deep tree
σ σ
σ
σ
σσ σ presc.
Bushy tree Right deep tree Extreme right deep tree
Query: Name of doctors who prescribed antibiotics after 01/01/2000
SELECT D.name
FROM Doctor D, Visit V, Prescription P, Drug d
WHERE D.DocId = V. DocId AND V.VisId = P.VisId
AND P.DrugId = D.DrugId AND D.type = ‘ANTIBIOTIC’
AND V.date > 01-jan-2000;
Healthcare Database schema:(sample)
Doctor (DocId, name, specialty, …)
Visit (VisId, DocId, date, diagnostic, …)
Prescription (VisId, DrugId, qty, …) 
Drug (DrugId, name, type, …)
 
Figure 5.  Several Execution Trees for Query Q1: 'Who prescribed antibiotics in 2000?'. 
In a PicoDBMS, the query optimizer should not consider any of these execution trees as they 
incur materialization. The solution is to only use pipelining with extreme right-deep trees where 
all the operators (including select) are pipelined. As left operands are always base relations, 
they are already materialized in stable memory, thus allowing executing a plan with no RAM 
consumption. Pipeline execution can be easily achieved using the well known Iterator Model 
[68]. A QEP is activated starting at the root of the operator tree. The dataflow in the model is 
demand-driven: a child operator passes a tuple to its parent node in response to a next call from 
the parent.  
The Select operator tests each incoming tuple against the selection predicates. The values of 
the incoming tuples needed to evaluate the predicate are directly read (FS) in the tuple and/or 
reached by dereferencing a pointer (DS/RIS) and/or by following a pointers ring. While in-
dexed (RS storage of the attribute participating in the selection), the selection predicate (or part 
of, whether multi-attribute) can be evaluated on the distinct values, and the matching tuples are 
directly retrieved following the pointers rings.  
Project simply builds a result tuple by copying the value (FS) and/or dereferencing the cursors 
(DS/RIS) and/or following the pointers ring to reach the value (RS) present in the input tuple. 
The project operator is pushed up to the tree since no materialization occurs. Note that the final 
project incurs an additional cost in case of ring attributes. 
Join implements a Cartesian product between its left and right inputs, since no other join tech-
nique can be applied without ad-hoc structures (e.g., hash tables) and/or working area (e.g., 
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sorting). Each incoming right tuple induce a complete iteration on the left input to retrieve the 
matching tuples. In case of indices (DS/RS/RIS), the cost of joins depends on the way indices 
are traversed. Consider the indexed join between Doctor (n tuples) and Visit (m tuples) on their 
key attribute. Assuming a unidirectional index, the join cost is proportional to n*m starting with 
Doctor (i.e., right input is Doctor) and to m starting with Visit (i.e., right input is Visit). Assum-
ing now a bi-directional index, the join cost becomes proportional to n+m starting with Doctor 
and to m²/2n starting with Visit (retrieving the doctor associated to each visit incurs traversing 
half of a ring in average). In the latter case, a naïve nested loop join can be more efficient if the 
ring cardinality is greater than the target relation cardinality (i.e., when m>n²). In that case, the 
database designer must clearly choose a unidirectional index between the two relations. 
We now consider the execution of the aggregate operator (sort operations is not described 
since it can be performed on the terminal). At first glance, pipeline execution is not compatible 
with aggregation, classically performed on materialized intermediate results. We propose a so-
lution to the above problem by exploiting two properties: (i) aggregate can be done in pipeline 
if the incoming tuples are yet grouped by distinct values and (ii) pipeline operators are order-
preserving since they consume (and produce) tuples in the arrival order. Thus, enforcing an 
adequate consumption order at the leaf of the execution tree allows pipelined aggregation. For 
instance, the extreme pipeline tree of figure 5 delivers the tuples naturally grouped by Drug.id, 
thus allowing group queries on that attribute. 
visit doc
drug
presc. σ
σ
count
drug drug.type
presc. 
count
visit
drug
presc. 
count
doc drug.type
Q2: Number of prescribed 
antibiotics per doctor in 1999
Q3: Number of prescription 
per type of drug
Q4: Number of prescriptions 
per doctor and type of drug  
Figure 6.  ‘Complex’ Query Execution Plans. 
Let us consider now query Q2 of figure 6. As pictured, executing Q2 in pipeline requires rear-
ranging the execution tree so that the relation Doctor is explored first. Since the relation Doctor 
contains distinct doctors, the tuples arriving to the count operator are naturally grouped by doc-
tors. The case of Q3 is harder. As the data must be grouped by type of drugs rather than by 
Drug.id, an additional join is required between the relation Drug and the domain Drug.type. 
Domain values being unique, this join produces the tuples in the adequate order. The case of 
Q4 is even trickier. The result must be grouped on two attributes (Doctor.id and Drug.type), 
introducing the need to start the tree with both relations. The solution is to insert a Cartesian 
product operator at the leaf of the tree in order to produce tuples ordered by Doctor.id and 
Drug.type. In this particular case, the query response time should be approximately n times 
greater than the same query without the ‘group by’ clause, where n is the number of distinct 
types of drugs.  
Regarding query optimization, the extreme right-deep trees context makes it rather straight-
forward. However, simple heuristics can give attractive enhancements. For example, the selec-
tions have to be executed as soon as possible, and the access ordering can favor the join indices 
traversal in the most favorable sense (only one possibility in case of unidirectional index, i.e., 
DS, and from the referred key relation to the referent foreign key one in case of bi-directional 
index, i.e., RS/RIS). 
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3.3 Transaction Processing  
A PicoDBMS must enforce the well-known transactional ACID properties. While being out 
of the scope of this study, we give a minimal description of the transaction processing to take 
its cost into account in the performance measurements.  
Regarding integrity control, traditional techniques are used and do not deserve any particular 
comments. Only structural (i.e., uniqueness and referential) constraints are considered in the 
performance evaluation. Regarding concurrency control, PicoDBMS has been developed on 
mono-threaded platforms and is used by a single user at a time. Hence, concurrency control is 
not a concern.  
The logging process deserves a deeper explanation. Logging is necessary to ensure local at-
omicity, global atomicity (in a distributed setting) and durability. As stated in [69], the cost of 
durability as well as global atomicity can be transferred to the network thanks to an ad-hoc pro-
tocol named Unilateral Commit for Mobile. The local atomicity must adapt to an update-in-
place model because shadow updates behave badly with a pointer-based storage model. A 
Write-Ahead Logging protocol (WAL) is followed to allow undo aborted updates. Traditional 
WAL logs the values of all modified data. RS allows a finer granularity by logging pointers in 
place of values. The smallest the log records, the cheapest the WAL (write rule). The log record 
contains the tuple address and the old attribute values, that is a pointer for each RS or DS stored 
attributes and a regular value for FS stored attributes. Rings come for free in term of logging 
because they can be regenerated from the tuple records at recovery time. In case of a tuple in-
sertion or deletion, only the tuple address has to be logged thanks to a status bit (i.e., dead or 
alive) in each tuple header. Insertion and deletion of domain values should be logged as any 
other updates. This overhead can be avoided by implementing a deferred garbage collector that 
destroys all domain values no longer referenced by any tuple [6].  
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This section evaluates the performance of PicoDBMS and raises the main lessons learned dur-
ing our experimentation. First, we introduce the performance metrics of the evaluations. Sec-
ond, we present the PicoDBMS footprint as well as the database footprint incurred by each 
candidate storage and indexation model, an important issue wrt the compactness rule. Third, we 
detail an in-depth query performance evaluation – combining measurements and simulations – 
to assess the ability of PicoDBMS to support complex authorizations with acceptable perform-
ance.  
4.1 Performance Metrics 
By focusing on transaction throughput, existing DBMS benchmarks (typically the TPC family 
[70]) are clearly inadequate to assess the performance of a PicoDBMS. Hence, the first issue is 
capturing the main characteristics of Pico-style databases to fix relevant performance metrics. 
These characteristics are:  
(C1) Low upper bound for the database footprint: from tens of KB up to one MB  (cf. Sec-
tion 2, Table I). 
(C2) Append-intensive update profile: Pico-style databases often contain historical data, 
while updates and deletes are less frequent (cf. Section 2.3). 
(C3) Sophisticated access rights: the authorized views may combine projections, selec-
tions, joins, and aggregates in their definition (cf. Section 2.3, Table 2). 
(C4) Chip viewed as a smart storage medium: users (either human or software) connect to 
the device to access (according to their access rights) the embedded data, analogously to any 
other storage device (magnetic disc, USB key, etc.). 
The following performance metrics are derived from these characteristics: 
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Data storage capacity: this metrics is expressed in terms of Ktuples/KB for a representative 
database. It measures (1) the ability of the DBMS engine to compress the on-board data and (2) 
the DBMS engine footprint itself which competes with the persistent data11. 
Insertion rate: this metrics is expressed in terms of inserted Ktuples/second. The update and 
delete costs must be acceptable, but are less significant for the target applications. 
Latency: this metrics is expressed in terms of time spent in second to produce the first result 
tuple for a given execution plan (representing a view). 
Transmission rate: this metrics is expressed in terms of result tuples produced per second. 
This metrics is relevant for applications concerned with the data transmission rate or by the 
total query execution time (e.g., to sort the complete result before display). 
As suggested by characteristic C4, latency and transmission rate are comparable to those em-
ployed for evaluating the performance of traditional storage medium. Characteristic C3 imposes 
measuring these performances for a broad range of queries (i.e., views), representing simple up 
to rather complex access rights. Finally, note that transaction throughput is not an issue in a 
PicoDBMS context. The issue is more to guarantee an acceptable response time for a single 
user/application (a few seconds is often considered as an acceptable threshold for user interac-
tions).  
4.2 PicoDBMS Kernel Footprint 
Figure 7(b) presents the respective size of the PicoDBMS modules while figure 7(a) gives the 
total footprint of the main implementation alternatives. While self-explanatory, these figures 
deserve two remarks. 
 
PicoDBMS version Storage model Indexation Footprint (KB) 
Flat-Based FS No 26 
Domain-Based FS/DS Join 30 
Ring-Based FS/DS/RS Join & select 39 
Ring-Inverse-Based FS/DS/RS/RIS Join & select 42 
(a) Different PicoDBMS Variations. 
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(b) Ring-Inversed-Based Version of PicoDBMS. 
Figure 7.  PicoDBMS Code Footprint. 
First, the code footprint is often considered as a main challenge and is largely exploited by 
lightweight DBMS editors for commercial purpose. Our experience contradicts this point. The 
reason for this is threefold: (1) the gap between the Ring-Inverse-based and the Flat-based ver-
sions of PicoDBMS is far less important than expected; (2) ROM cells are 4 times smaller than 
EEPROM cells and so are the respective benefits of decreasing the code and the data footprint; 
                                                          
11 In a real setting, the DBMS engine is located in ROM while the data are stored in EEPROM. How-
ever, since ROM and EEPROM compete on the same silicon die, both measurements are relevant. 
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(3) minimizing the code footprint leads to select the flat storage model, strongly increasing the 
database footprint (see next section).  
Second, Figure 7(b) shows that the metadata management module is rather heavy compared 
to the others. Indeed, several query execution plans cannot fit in RAM simultaneously. This 
precludes to store metadata inside traditional database relations, and to access it by means of 
queries. Metadata are therefore stored in ad-hoc structures, and are accessed by calling ad-hoc 
procedures, explaining the heavy footprint of this component. 
4.3 Database Footprint 
This section evaluates the database compactness obtained by the four candidate storage and 
indexation models (FS, DS, RS, and RIS). This evaluation cannot be conducted accurately us-
ing a synthetic dataset, unable to translate a real-life distribution of duplicate values. Thanks to 
our contact with medical partners, we used for this experience a subset of a genuine medical 
dataset, stored into the simplified database schema presented in figure 8.  
Figure 9(a) pictures the data storage capacity for each model and the average tuples per KB 
for each, e.g. 43 tuples per KB with DS, while figure 9(b) and figure 9(c) plot ratios between 
these models. RIS performs really badly (RIS is very close to FS) compared to DS and RS. 
Thus, RIS should be adopted only if it provides a significant performance gain at query execu-
tion time. DS and RS provide relatively close results, highlighting the high compactness of ring 
indices. In addition, the more the embedded tuples, the less the indexation cost and the most 
effective DS which acts as a dictionary compression scheme. This remark induces that for big-
ger smart cards, indices comes at a lower cost. 
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Figure 8.  Medical Database Schema. 
Note also that the total number of embedded tuples does not exceed 50.000 for a smart card 
providing 1MB of stable storage. Thus, we do not examine in the sequel queries involving more 
than this upper bound. 
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(a) Amount of embedded tuples.      (b) Gain Compared to FS.       (c) Lost Compared to DS. 
Figure 9.  Data Storage Capacity. 
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4.4 PicoDBMS Performance 
This section measures the PicoDBMS performance for update (tuple insertion) and queries 
(view evaluation). Two different platforms have been used to conduct these experiments: a real 
smart card prototype and a hardware simulator of this prototype (both provided by Axalto), the 
latter allowing us to consider datasets exceeding the current smart card storage capacity. We 
present below these two platforms, the dataset and queries considered in our Pico-style bench-
mark and the performance results.  
4.4.1 Experimentation Platforms 
The real smart card prototype is equipped with a 32 bit CPU running at 50 MHz, 64 KB of 
EEPROM, 96 KB of ROM, and 4 KB of RAM (among which only a hundred of bytes remains 
available for the application). An internal timer allows measuring the response time for each 
incoming APDU12. The PicoDBMS code being located in EEPROM in this prototype, the up-
per bound for the database footprint is reduced to 22 KB. 
To assess the performance on larger datasets (up to 1MB), we used the simulation platform 
pictured in Figure 10. This platform is made of a hardware simulator of the smart card proto-
type connected to a control PC, and linked to a client PC connected to a standard smart card 
reader (ISO 7816 standard). This hardware simulator is cycle accurate, meaning that it monitors 
the exact number of CPU cycles between two breakpoints set in the embedded code. We 
checked the accuracy of the simulator comparing the simulator measures on small databases to 
the one obtained using the real smart card prototype. 
 
Control  PC
Hardware simulator
Client PC
 
Figure 10.  Smart Card Simulation Platform. 
The smart card prototype as well as the hardware simulator run a modified version of the Ze-
Platform operating system. Indeed, taking advantage of the PicoDBMS experience, Axalto 
modified the initial version of their operating system to better support data intensive operations 
(a rather unusual case in traditional smart card applications). Among others, direct accesses to 
the EEPROM have been optimized, a crucial point for pointer-based storage and indexation 
models. Thanks to these modifications and to the rewriting of PicoDBMS in C, the performance 
gain was roughly two orders of magnitude compared with the JavaCard PicoDBMS prototype 
demonstrated at VLDB’01 [12]. 
4.4.2 Dataset and Queries 
For the performance evaluation, we use a synthetic dataset (thus different from the real data-
set used to observe data compactness) to control and vary the selectivity of each attribute. The 
corresponding database schema is pictured in figure 11. It is representative of a complex em-
bedded database. Relations cardinality ratios are similar to the TPC-R/H/W benchmarks, that is 
to say a large relation (R0) referencing two relations (R1 and R2) 6 times smaller, each refer-
encing in turn a relation (resp. R3, R4) 6 times smaller. 
 
                                                          
12 The APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) is the communication unit between the smart card and 
the reader, as defined by the ISO 7816 standard. The communication cost between the smart card and the 
reader is actually not taken into account in the measurements. Indeed, this cost is not a long term bottle-
neck, some USB smart cards with a 8Mbps throughput being already developed. 
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Figure 11.  Synthetic Database Schema. 
Table 3 details the content of relation R0. The other relations share the same structure, except 
that they hold a single foreign key attribute. Note that attribute A0 is stored in FS since it is 
unique and cannot benefit from DS, RS, or RIS models. A3 and A4 are never stored in DS 
since they have the same size as a pointer and participate only in projections (see below). 
 
Table 3. Schema of Relation R0. 
Attribute name Integrity constraint Value type Storage model Distinct values Size in bytes 
A0 Primary key Numeric FS |R0 | 4 
A1, A2 Foreign key Numeric FS/DS/RS/RIS |R0 |/6 4 
A3  Numeric FS/RS/RIS |R0 |/6 4 
A4  Numeric FS/RS/RIS |R0 |/100 4 
A5, A6, A7, A8, A9  Char. string FS/DS/RS/RIS |R0 |/10 20 (avg.) 
 
Table 4. Query Set for the Performance Evaluation. 
Acronym Access right description Corresponding representative query 
P Subset of attributes Multi-projection on R0 
SP Predicates on a single relation Multi-selection on R0 
SPJ Predicates on two relations (direct relationship) Multi-selection, join between R0 and R1 
SPJn Predicates on several relations (transitive relationship) Multi-selection, joins between R0-R1-R2-R3-R4 
SPG Single relation, mono-attribute aggregation Mono-attribute group by on R0, one aggregation 
SPJG Several relations, mono-attribute aggregation 
Joins between R0, R1, R3, mono-attribute group by, one 
aggregation 
SPJGn Multi-attribute aggregation Joins between R0, R1, R3, group by on two attributes of two distinct relations, one aggregation 
 
As shown in table 4, the queries measured are representative of the access right classification 
introduced in Section 2. The attributes on which project, select, join and group by apply are not 
specified in table 4. The reason for this is that the query pattern is instantiated and measured on 
different attributes, allowing us to present both the best and worst cases for given query pat-
terns, when significant. The curves presented in the next sections plot performance for different 
values of project, select and join selectivity, and grouping factor. When not specified, default 
values are assumed for these parameters: the default projection selectivity is set to 2 attributes 
(this parameter is actually not a bottleneck), the default selection selectivity is set to 1% of the 
input relation, default joins are equi-joins on key attributes (i.e., the number of result tuples 
equals the referencing relation cardinality) and the default grouping factor is set to 1% (i.e., 
each group aggregates 100 input tuples). 
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Finally, the remaining of this section will concentrate on the transmission rate metrics. In-
deed, while the analogy between the smart card and a magnetic disk (see Section 5.1) is still 
valid, the latency parameter is not indicated here. Indeed, it can be directly deduced from the 
transmission rate, the additional treatments exclusively linked to the delivery of the first tuple 
(building the query execution plan) turning to be negligible in all situations (from 1 to 4 milli-
seconds depending on the query plan complexity). It strictly corresponds to the time required to 
build the query plan, the tuples being computed in a pure pipeline fashion.  
4.4.3 Tuple Insertion  
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(a) Insertion rate.            (b) Relative performance gain wrt FS. 
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(c) Decomposed costs. 
Figure 12.  Performance of Insertions. 
Characteristic C2 makes the performance of tuple insertion an important aspect of the evalua-
tion. In the experiment, the tuples are inserted into R0. Most insertions actually occur in R0 
since this relation has the biggest cardinality. Moreover, insertion in this relation represents a 
worst case in terms of performance since it involves the highest integrity control cost: two ref-
erential constraints have to be checked and the cost of the uniqueness constraint increases with 
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the cardinality of the relation. More precisely, a tuple insertion involves the four following 
steps. 
Integrity Enforcement (IE): the target relation (here, R0) must be scanned entirely to check 
the uniqueness constraint as well as part of each referenced relation to check the referential 
constraint. 
Domain Update (DU): for RS, DS and RIS, the value of each attribute of the inserted tuple 
has to be searched in the corresponding domain and added if not present. The figures below 
show the most frequent cost, where the value already exists in the domain (domains turn to be 
rather stable after a first bunch of insertions). 
Tuple Creation (TC): a new chunk of memory is allocated in the target relation and values 
and pointers are written into it. 
Log Management (LM): this operation relates to the pointer-based logging mechanism 
sketched in Section 3.3. 
Figure 12(a) shows that the insertion rate is acceptable (more than one tuple per second) 
whatever the considered storage model. Figure 12(b) shows that the benefit of DS and RS com-
pared to FS decreases with the cardinality of the relation. While the compactness of the storage 
model has a positive impact on the write cost in stable storage (write rule), the cardinality of the 
target relation negatively impacts the IE and DU costs. Note that the IE cost could be reduced 
thanks to an additional index on the primary key but this would increase in turn the index up-
date cost (writes in stable storage) with a negative effect on small relations and would affect the 
database footprint. Since transaction throughput is not an issue here, the main conclusion is the 
one delivered by figure 12(a). Hence, no storage model actually hurt the expected insertion rate, 
making additional effort to speed-up insertions useless. While Pico-style databases are more 
insertion than update driven, we did not identify so far insertion intensive scenarios. 
4.4.4 Projection 
Figure 13 gives the transmission rate for project queries, representative of the P access right 
type. Curves are plotted for each storage model in function of the number of attributes partici-
pating in the projection. The following conclusions can be raised: 
The transmission rate is independent of the relation cardinality: obviously, the project opera-
tor requires the same time to produce each tuple.  
RS slows down the projection: RS induces in average the traversal of half of a ring to reach 
the value of a given attribute. In our dataset, the average length of rings is 10 pointers, thereby 
leading to a performance degradation by a factor of 5 (note the logarithmic scale of Figure 13). 
The projection is not a bottleneck: the throughput is over 5000 results per second whatever be 
the considered storage model and the number of projected attributes. 
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Figure 13.  Projection Transmission Rate. 
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4.4.5 Selection 
Figure 14 presents the transmission rate for mono-relation selection queries, representative of 
the SP access right type. The transmission rate is presented as a function of the query selectivity 
in figure 14(a) and as a function of the selection complexity (number of attributes involved in 
the qualification) in figure 14(b). These curves lead to the following remarks. 
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(a) Mono-attribute Selection.     (b) Multi-attribute Selection. 
Figure 14.  Selection Transmission Rate. 
The transmission rate is independent of the relation cardinality: the select operator, similarly 
to the project operator, requires a constant time to produce each tuple.  
The transmission rate benefits from a low query selectivity: indeed, the worse the query selec-
tivity, the less irrelevant tuples scanned and checked before producing a matching tuple.  
RIS and RS models outperform DS and FS: RIS and RS offer natural selection indices. The 
performance gain is directly determined by the ratio between domains and relations cardinal-
ities (set to 10 in our dataset). When the selection involves several attributes, the performance 
gap between indexed and non-indexed models decreases, highlighting the fact that the Pi-
coDBMS execution model can exploit a single selection index for a given query. 
 
4.4.6 Join 
Figure 15 presents the performance of queries representative of SPJ and SPJn access right 
types, involving both selections and joins, with different query selectivity. Figure 15 measures 
the performance of pure join queries varying the number of joins. These two figures are neces-
sary to capture the incidence of selection on join queries. Let us first consider the conclusions 
that can be drawn from figure 15. 
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(a) DS/RS/RIS Model.    (b) FS Model. 
Figure 15.  Join Transmission Rate. 
High transmission rate for RIS, RS and DS: thanks to their intrinsic indexed nature, these 
models exhibit a high throughput for pure join queries, regardless of the database size and the 
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number of joins. As stated in Section 3.1, DS naturally implements a unidirectional join index 
between a foreign-key attribute and the corresponding primary key attribute. RS and RIS do 
nothing but making this index bi-directional. The best join ordering privileges traversals from 
foreign to primary keys, allowing producing each result tuple of a query involving N joins by 
traversing only N-1 domain pointers. This explains the low performance gap between RIS/RS 
and DS in the figure. However, this favorable situation cannot always be reached, typically if 
selections impose selecting another join ordering. This point will be further discussed. Not sur-
prisingly, FS exhibits poor performance comparing to the three other models. Moreover, FS 
scales very badly as the database size augments (see figure 15(b)).  
Let us now consider figure 16, measuring the performance of SPJ and SPJn queries. The 
transmission rate is plotted varying the query selectivity for RIS, RS and DS models (these 
models have been shown independent of the database cardinality), and varying the database 
cardinality for FS (with a default selectivity of 1%). For the SPJn  query pattern, the queries 
instances may favor different models depending on the relation on which the selections apply. 
To capture this, figure 16 plots the best and worst cases of the transmission rate for each model. 
While self-explanatory, these curves deserve the following remarks. First, the performance of 
the join increases while the selection selectivity decreases. As for selection queries, the worse 
the query selectivity, the less irrelevant tuples scanned and checked before producing a match-
ing tuple. Second, RS and RIS clearly outperform DS when selections are considered. As stated 
before, DS imposes a unique join ordering in the query plan, thereby precluding the use of a 
selection index. Hence, the choice of RS or RIS to store the foreign key attributes is relevant. 
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(a) Single Join with Selection (SPJ) – DS/RS/RIS. (b) Single Join with Selection (SPJ) – FS. 
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(c) Multi-join with Selections (SPJn) – DS/RS/RIS. (d) Multi-join with Selections (SPJn) – FS. 
Figure 16.  SPJ and SPJn Transmission Rate. 
4.4.7 Aggregation 
Aggregation queries implement CA authorizations, granting access to computed values with-
out granting access to the occurrences taking part in the computation, a rather usual and impor-
tant class of authorizations. Figure 17 presents the transmission rates of queries representative 
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of the SPG, SPJG and SPJGn access rights (see Table 4). These curves lead to the following 
remarks:  
DS and FS support aggregations badly: the transmission rate is poor for both models, even 
for mono-attribute aggregations, and strongly depends on the database cardinality. Indeed, DS 
induces a Cartesian product between the domain the aggregation applies on and the relation, 
while FS induces successive sequential scans of the relation to produce the result. When joins 
are combined in the query, the performance of DS remains stable (thanks to a high join deliv-
ery) while FS collapses (under one tuple per second).  
RIS and RS support mono-attribute aggregations gracefully: thanks to rings, the presence of 
joins in the query has little impact on the performance (see figure 17(a) and figure 17(c)). 
While the performance is independent of the database cardinality (as for join queries), the 
grouping factor has a strong influence. For example, a 10% grouping factor (i.e., the aggrega-
tion divides the number of tuples by 10), roughly decrease the performance by a factor 10 com-
pared to non-aggregative query.  
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(a) Mono-aggregation (SPG) – RS & RIS. (b) Mono-aggregation (SPG) – FS/DS. 
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(c) Mono-agg., Joins (SPJG) – RS/RIS.   (d) Mono-agg., Joins (SPJG) – FS & DS. 
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     (e) Multi-agg., Joins (SPJGn).   
Figure 17.  Transmission Rate of Aggregation Queries (SPG, SPJG, SPJGn). 
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RIS and RS support multi-attribute aggregation reasonably: as pictured in figure 17(e), the 
transmission rate depends now on the database cardinality for all storage models. Indeed, even 
with RS and RIS, only one of the attributes involved in the group by clause benefits from the 
ring storage. However, the performance remains acceptable with RS and RIS since more than 
80 result tuples per second are still delivered.  
4.4.8 Concluding Remarks on Transmission Rates.  
To help comparing the FS, DS, RS and RIS models, table 5 expresses their relative perform-
ance in terms of ratio for all classes of queries. In each line of table 5, the gray cell serves as a 
reference to establish the ratios. The transmission rates have been computed considering 1000 
tuples in relation R0.  
Table 5. Transmission rate ratios. 
Storage model 
Operation type FS DS RS RIS 
Insert query 1 4,8 1,1 0,7 
P 1 0,9 0,5 0,9 
SP 1 0,9 8,7 8,7 
SPJ 0,08 1 23,4 23,4 
SPJn 0,01 1 7,1 15,2 
SPG 0,7 1 136 136 
SPJG 0,002 1 118 228 
Select query 
SPJGn 0,002 1 19 31 
 
DS gives the best transmission rate in terms of insertion and outperforms FS to process que-
ries involving joins (from one to three orders of magnitude). Adding rings provides a major 
benefit for join and aggregate computations (again an improvement from one to two orders of 
magnitude over DS). However, the benefit provided by RIS compared to RS is rather disap-
pointing (at most a factor 2 when several joins participate in a query), especially when consid-
ering the loss it incurs in terms of database compactness. Nevertheless, note that for particular 
database schemas, like star schemas where a central large relation is referenced by several small 
relations through large rings (e.g., hundred of pointers), RIS model could become valuable.  
5 Data Management on Chip: Research Directions 
PicoDBMS has been designed to provide an effective solution to secured portable folders on 
smart cards. This section shows that database components (not limited to PicoDBMS) embed-
ded on secured chips (not limited to smart cards) can be exploited in other important contexts 
and can open very exciting research perspectives.  
Section 5.1 focuses on hardware characteristics of secured chips and on their impact on the 
design of embedded DBMS components (storage, indexation, query execution, etc.). Section 
5.2 studies how to extend the sphere of confidentiality of secured chips towards external (unse-
cured) resources. Section 5.3 considers the huge problem of confidentiality raised by the inva-
sion of smart objects in our everyday life. Finally, Section 5.4 addresses some issues raised by 
the management of embedded XML data. 
5.1 Research Perspectives Driven by Hardware Constraints  
Section 2.2 gave an insight of the diversity of secured chips. Whatever their form factor, envi-
ronment and objectives, secured chips share similar hardware constraints. Indeed, the chip size 
needs to be reduced for (i) security reasons (to render the cost of physical attacks prohibitive), 
(ii) economical considerations (to reduce the production cost, hence the silicium die size, on 
mass-market), and (iii) environmental constraints (to ease the chip integration in domestic ap-
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pliances, in smart objects and even in the human body in medical applications).  All the hard-
ware resources (CPU, ROM, RAM, stable storage, etc) compete on the same silicium die and 
they can be balanced in different ways to cope with different requirements. Hence, co-design 
strategies are required to calibrate a hardware platform according to given application require-
ments. In the following, we focus on some important hardware constraints, and mention inter-
esting co-design issues. 
5.1.1. RAM Resource 
RAM is a crucial resource in secured chips because of its poor density. Chip manufacturers 
usually privilege stable storage to the detriment of a RAM strictly calibrated to hold the execu-
tion stack required by on-board programs. Unfortunately, RAM is also a crucial resource wrt 
the evaluation of database queries. PicoDBMS has been designed to cope with this issue, ac-
cording to the RAM rule. The solution proposed relies on an intensive use of indices. While 
this solution is convenient for the targeted context, indices may be disqualified in other contexts 
because they increase update cost, they make update atomicity more complex to implement and 
they competes with on-board data. This may cause problems for update intensive applications 
(e.g., sensed data). In addition, throwing away indices may help reducing the database footprint 
and the code complexity (thereby the hardware resources in a co-design perspective) in con-
texts where performance is not the major issue. 
In [16] we studied how to minimize the RAM consumption in the query execution, assuming 
no indices. The objective was precisely to follow a co-design approach wrt the RAM amount 
and the required performance. First, we designed a RAM lower bound query execution model, 
concentrating on the algorithmic structure of each relational operator and on the way the data-
flow between these operators must be organized. This model induces several iterations on the 
data to compute the query result. Second, we devised a new form of optimization, called itera-
tion filter that drastically reduces the prohibitive cost incurred by the preceding model, without 
hurting this RAM lower bound. Finally, we analyzed how to benefit from an incremental 
growth of the RAM amount. This analysis provides valuable information to determine: how 
much RAM should be added to reach a given response time, how much the expected response 
time should be relaxed to tackle a given query with a given quantity of RAM, how much data 
can be embedded in a given device without hurting an expected execution time.  
This work can be considered as a first step towards more complete co-design works aiming at 
calibrating all resources of a hardware platform. 
5.1.2. Stable Memory 
In the PicoDBMS study, we focus on EEPROM technology because current smart cards are 
endowed with this technology. However, many alternative stable memories could be envisioned 
for secured chips. We sketch here interesting research issues raised by the memory technologies 
mentioned in Section 2.1. (i.e., FLASH memory, mix of FLASH and EEPROM, long term al-
ternatives).  
FLASH memory could become an effective short term alternative for secured chips due to its 
compactness. FLASH memory can be read and write at a fine grain (e.g., bytes or small pages), 
but erasure can only be done at a coarse grain (e.g., large blocks). In addition, there is more 
than one order of magnitude between erasure and write operation and another one between 
write and read. These specific properties should be taken into account when designing embed-
ded database components and specifically when designing the data storage and indexation 
models. Indeed, the reduced RAM of secured chips advocates for a highly indexed storage 
model while the high cost of coarse grain erasure in FLASH advocates for a sequential storage 
model.  
Secured chips could also be endowed with a combination of FLASH and EEPROM. In this 
context, the performance of database operations is drastically impacted by the storage model 
and the placement of the indices, data and metadata in each memory. A co-design study should 
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be particularly helpful to determine (i) the balance between both types of memory and (ii) the 
FLASH characteristics (e.g., page and block size). 
Long term memory alternatives could also be envisioned, including technologies like PCM, 
OUM and Millipedes. These memories also provide very specific and interesting access proper-
ties which directly impact the storage and indexation model. There are already some works on 
Millipedes [71] in a classical database context. Combining the memory properties with the 
other hardware constraints will undoubtedly generate interesting problems. 
5.1.3. Cache Conscious Strategies 
Another interesting research issue is to improve the processor data cache usage when process-
ing queries. Indeed, some announced smart cards are now endowed with a cache holding up to 
1 KB. Since query execution with a constrained RAM induces numerous iterations on the data 
(e.g., to perform group by, joins without index), cache conscious algorithms could bring great 
performance improvements, diminishing the overheads of these iterations.   
Cache conscious strategies have been envisioned on traditional and main-memory DBMS and 
led to reorganize indices storage [72] and data layout [73][74]. Recently, cryptographic algo-
rithms requiring high throughput have been implemented in a cache conscious manner [76]. 
The challenge is that cache conscious processing generally leads to rethink data and index stor-
age organization in a way which may contradict other concerns like data compactness and spe-
cific storage models dedicated to new stable memories.  
Co-design could again be helpful to help calibrating the processor cache and the RAM, both 
competing on the same silicium die.  
5.1.4. Contactless Interactions 
Contactless interfaces are more and more promoted by constructors and governmental organi-
zations for their ease of use [26]. While the current PicoDBMS design could adapt contactless 
smart cards, whether the processing requirements (in terms of query types and execution time) 
remain the same is an important question. For instance, severe response time constraints have to 
be enforced to avoid the card holder to stop when passing near a contactless reader. A possible 
solution could be to reduce the completeness/accuracy of the result for applications accepting 
partial results (e.g., top queries, approximate answers).  
5.2. Extending the Sphere of Confidentiality to External Resources 
Secured chips are often plugged into or linked to more powerful devices (e.g., cell phone, 
PDA, PC, and even servers). Thus, it does make sense to take advantage of the device resources 
to overcome the secured chip limitations. The idea is to extend the sphere of confidentiality 
provided by the security properties of the chip to external resources. This is actually the ap-
proach followed by the TCPA architecture where the secured chip protects the whole PC plat-
form. This section sketches how to extend the sphere of confidentiality to external (unsecured) 
storage resources (section 5.2.1), to external processing resources (section 5.2.2) and finally to 
a shared database server (section 5.2.3).  
5.1.1 External Storage Resources 
One of the main limiting factor of traditional smart cards to address new domains of applica-
tions is the tiny capacity of the stable memory. To tackle this important issue, several smart 
card manufacturers are pushing new architectures combining the security of smart cards with 
very large (but insecure) FLASH memory modules. For instance, the Gemplus’ SUMO "smart 
card" [75] provides 224 MB of FLASH memory dispatched within the plastic substrate; the X-
Mobile Card [77] combines in a MMC form factor a secure smart card chip and a large FLASH 
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memory. These efforts are supported by the MObile PASSport (MOPASS) consortium13. Up to 
8GB of stable storage are expected in the coming years for these architectures.  
In this context, the problem is to use this external storage without losing the traditional secu-
rity of smart cards. The external storage being insecure, four categories of attacks must be con-
sidered: (1) Data Snooping (read or infer forbidden data); (2) Data Altering (modify - even 
randomly - forbidden data); (3) Data Substituting (replace valid data with another valid data); 
and (4) Data Replaying (replace valid data with an older version of the same data).  The device 
owner himself can attempt to tamper his own data (e.g., to replay a medical act refund using his 
medical folder). To prevent from information disclosure and protect the data integrity, crypto-
graphic techniques (e.g., encryption, secure hash functions, etc.) must be employed. Some 
metadata (encryption keys, checksums, freshness information, bootstrap, etc.) and the query 
evaluator itself must remain embedded in the secured chip to deliver only the authorized data to 
the user. The problem is to combine cryptographic techniques and query execution techniques 
in a way satisfying three conflicting objectives: efficiency, high security and compliance with 
the chip hardware resources. In [78], we conduct an introductive study of this problem consid-
ering smart cards enhanced with external FLASH memory. 
5.1.2 External Processing Resources 
Secured chips are often connected to active devices endowed with processing resources 
largely exceeding those of the chip itself (e.g., a smart card or dongle plugged into a cellular 
phone, a PDA or a PC). Exploiting these external computing resources can be helpful to man-
age a huge amount of data, in situations like the one depicted in the preceding section. In addi-
tion, this could allow minimizing the chip hardware resources in a co-design perspective. How-
ever, externalized processing must be opaque (it should not reveal any information on the data 
being processed) and tamper resistant (the honesty of the result must be provable). 
While cryptographic techniques can provide opacity and tamper resistance for the external-
ized data, providing these same properties for externalized processing is today an open prob-
lem. Indeed, checking the tamper resistance of an externalized processing might be as expen-
sive as the processing itself. Some techniques exist for simple selections (with plaintext data) 
[79] but the problem remains unsolved for more complex operations. Enforcing the opacity of 
externalized processing seems even more difficult to reach since some information about the 
input and output parameters is always disclosed (even if encrypted) and can be exploited by an 
attacker. The work conducted on Private Information Retrieval (PIR) illustrates well this prob-
lem [80]. 
Delegating external processing on external (encrypted) data is thus a very challenging re-
search perspective. 
5.1.3 External Shared Database 
The two preceding sections discuss the extension of the sphere of confidentiality towards ex-
ternal storage and processing resources but do not consider the sharing issue. This does not 
mean that all forms of sharing are precluded but rather that the sharing is under the control of a 
single chip, the external resources being considered as direct extensions of this chip (e.g., a 
PicoDBMS delegating storage and processing to a connected device). 
Assuming the database is stored on a remote and unsecured server and is shared among dif-
ferent users leads to another spectrum of applications. For instance, one may consider a shared 
database hosted by an – untrusted – Database Service Provider. The Database Service Provider 
Model has been studied for the first time in [82], but sharing was not a concern in this study. 
The sharing issue has been tackled in [83] thanks to an architecture called Chip-Secured Data 
Access (C-SDA). C-SDA is a client-based security solution where a smart card acts as an incor-
ruptible mediator between a user and a remote encrypted database. The smart card checks the 
                                                          
13 The MOPASS consortium is composed of 61 companies including the main smart card and chip 
manufacturers (e.g., Gemplus, Hitachi, Sharp, NEC, etc.). http://www.mopass.info/english/ 
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user’s privileges, participates in the query evaluation and decrypts the final result before deliv-
ering it to the user. Since then, this hot topic generated several papers including [84][85]. So 
far, existing studies focused on the confidentiality of the remote data but disregarded tamper-
resistance (including opacity, integrity and freshness). Compared to section 5.2.2, enforcing 
tamper-resistance properties is more complex in the presence of multiple users, each possessing 
a personal secured chip (e.g., smart card, dongle). Indeed, sensible information like checksums, 
or freshness information can no longer be hosted by the secured chips due to potential inconsis-
tencies in case of updates. Solutions relying on a secured co-processor at the server side could 
be investigated and would raise new research challenges. 
5.2 Hippocratic Smart Objects 
In the ubiquitous world, people are surrounded by smart, networked and interacting objects, 
aware of people’s presence and needs, and adjusting their actions accordingly [86]. As a side 
effect, data confidentiality can be compromised in a number of ways and people are reluctant to 
participate in smart environments (e.g., active badge initiatives attest that many employees do 
not wear the badge tracking their location). 
Secured chips can bring guarantees about the confidentiality of the monitored, stored and 
transmitted data, in the same spirit as Hippocratic DBMS.  Hippocratic databases have been 
introduced in [43] to ensure that personal data are used in strict compliance with the purpose 
for which the donor of these data gave his consent. More precisely, Hippocratic databases en-
compass ten principles: Purpose Specification, Consent, Limited Collection, Limited Use, Lim-
ited Disclosure, Limited Retention, Accuracy, Safety, Openness, and Compliance. While en-
forcing these principles is still an open issue in a general setting, our belief is that secured chips 
can provide accurate solutions in a smart object context, making these objects inherently Hip-
pocratic.  
5.3 Embedding XML Database Components 
The study presented in this paper has been conducted in the relational context. As XML be-
comes a de-facto standard to describe heterogeneous data and exchange them among applica-
tions, the need for managing XML data on chip arises. For instance, XML may be the appropri-
ate data model for managing portable personal profiles shared among multiple applications 
(e.g., in a Virtual Home Environment). 
Considering the XML data model raises new concerns. First, while many proposals have been 
made for storing and indexing XML data, we are not aware of XML storage and indexation 
models dedicated to chips. The complexity comes from the semi-structured and hierarchical 
nature of the data.  Second, existing XML access control models are rule-based rather than 
view-based [87][88][84]. This introduces the concern of evaluating a rule-based access control 
policy in a way compatible with the chip hardware constraints. As a first step in this direction, 
[89] proposed a streaming XML access control evaluator embedded in a smart card. Digital 
Right Management models [10][41][11] expressing complex conditions on XML metadata in-
troduce new challenges regarding the enforcement of access control policies on streaming – 
multimedia – objects.  
6 Conclusion 
Four years after the publication of the – challenging – PicoDBMS design, the objective of this 
paper was actually to answer the three important questions raised in the introduction.  
The first question was whether the hardware and applications evolution changed the initial 
problem statement. As shown in section 2.1, while smart card hardware does not escape 
Moore’s law, the resource dissymmetry characterizing smart cards (and then dictating the Pi-
coDBMS design) is rather stable for both technological and economical reasons. At the same 
time, the introduction of (smart card-like) secured chips in usual computing infrastructures are 
broadening the scope of PicoDBMS applications towards complex secured portable folders, 
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advanced DRM model enforcement, Hippocratic smart objects. The first contribution of this 
paper was to revisit the PicoDBMS problem statement in this light, putting the focus on access 
control management. 
The second question was related to the feasibility of the approach. Clearly, the smart card 
technology (both hardware and software) at our disposal in 2001 was totally unsuitable for data 
intensive embedded applications [12]. Three years of joint efforts from our team (PicoDBMS 
optimization and rewriting in C) and from our industrial partner Axalto (new hardware plat-
form, OS adaptation) were necessary to get a convincing prototype. A benchmark dedicated to 
Pico-style databases has been designed and used to assess the relative performance of candidate 
storage and indexation data structures, both on a real smart card platform and on a cycle-
accurate simulator. By giving hints to select the appropriate storage and indexation structure for 
a given application according to the volume of embedded data, the required access rights and 
the expected response time, this performance study constitutes the second contribution of this 
paper. 
The third question was whether PicoDBMS opens up a broad and long term research. Clearly, 
relational data management on traditional smart card is now well understood (we hope that the 
current paper participates to this understanding). However, secured chips are invading our eve-
ryday life through a wide variety of form factors: contactless cards, smart dongles, mass storage 
cards, secured user appliance, secured smart objects etc. The hardware technology is evolving 
accordingly: huge amount of unsecured stable storage, high communication throughput, future 
(long-term) stable storage technologies etc. New embedded data management techniques need 
to be devised to cope with this evolution, like managing very large on-board databases, protect-
ing them against new forms of attacks, taking advantage of the communication throughput to 
externalize data and/or processing. Co-design is undoubtedly a very important issue in this con-
text. Finally, the secured chip can be integrated in an insecure distributed computing system 
(e.g., a database system) and be the ultimate trusted party the complete security relies on. 
Hence, we expect that this paper will contribute to the definition of a fascinating research 
agenda for database techniques on secured chip. 
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